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Abstract 
Whether international human rights treaties constrain the behavior of governments is 
a hotly contested issue that has drawn much scholarly attention. The possibility to 
derogate from some, but not all, of the rights enshrined in the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) during declared and officially notified states of 
emergency provides a hitherto unexplored test case. If governments were increasingly 
violating non-derogable rights during derogation periods then this provides evidence 
that the ICCPR has no sufficient constraining effect on state parties. I analyze whether 
specific individual human rights as well as two aggregate rights measures are 
systematically more violated during derogation periods in a global sample over the 
period 1981 to 2008. I find that regime type matters: autocracies step up violation of 
both non-derogable and derogable rights, anocracies increasingly violate some 
derogable and some non-derogable rights, whereas democracies see no statistically 
significant change in their human rights behavior during derogation periods. This 
result suggests that the main general international human rights treaty fails to achieve 
its objective of shielding certain rights from derogation where, as in autocracies and 
anocracies, a constraining effect would be needed most. 
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“The response of a state to a public emergency is an acid test 
of its commitment to the effective implementation of human 
rights” (McGoldrick 2004: 388) 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Whether international law commitments undertaken by states constrain their human 
rights behavior is a topic which has generated significant interest among international 
relations scholars. This is unsurprising: much time and effort is spent on designing 
and promoting international human rights treaties and persuading countries to ratify 
them, hence the quest for analyzing whether these treaties have a real impact on state 
behavior. Theoretical approaches strongly differ in the expectations they generate on 
any potential behavior-constraining effect of international human rights treaties 
(Neumayer 2005). Empirical results also differ, with some studies finding positive 
effects under some conditions, while other studies come to the conclusion that treaties 
have no positive effect on human rights at best and possibly even negative effects 
(Hathaway 2002; Goldsmith and Posner 2005; Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2007; 
Hafner-Burton 2008; Morrow 2007; Simmons 2009; Gilligan and Nesbitt 2009; 
Powell and Staton 2009; Hill 2010; Hollyer and Rosendorff 2011). There is thus no 
clear picture emerging on this important topic. 
Human rights violations during officially declared and notified states of 
emergency can bring an important additional piece of new evidence to this question. 
Ironically, even if governments were to increase human rights violations during such 
periods, this is not necessarily inconsistent with a behavior-constraining effect of 
international human rights treaties. Article 4 of the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights (ICCPR) allows states to derogate from observing most of the 
rights enshrined in this treaty if they declare a state of emergency and officially 
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inform other state parties via the United Nations General Secretary (UNGS).1 
However, Article 4 also lists a range of human rights that states cannot derogate from 
even in public emergencies. If one were to find that governments indiscriminately 
step up human rights violations during declared states of emergencies, including those 
that they cannot derogate from, then this demonstrates that the ICCPR does not 
sufficiently constrain state behavior as it should under these circumstances. To be 
sure, such evidence would not provide conclusive proof that the ICCPR has no effect 
at all as one could argue counter-factually that states would violate the non-derogable 
human rights even more if there were no such international human rights treaty in 
place. However, if states were to ignore the fact that they simply cannot derogate from 
the protection of certain human rights, then this demonstrates that the ICCPR does not 
achieve its stated objective of shielding certain rights from derogation. 
In this study, I will investigate whether state parties to the ICCPR that 
derogate from their obligations have systematically worse human rights during 
officially declared and notified states of emergency than during other times, allowing 
for this effect to differ across autocracies, anocracies and democracies. Moreover, I 
distinguish among different human rights and thus analyze whether the effect of 
derogations depends on whether rights are derogable or not. 
I find that democracies do not systematically step up violation of any human 
rights during derogation periods, with the possible exception of electoral self-
determination. Anocracies and autocracies, in contrast, increasingly violate derogable 
rights and step up violation of rights that should be non-derogable under the ICCPR 
derogation provisions as well. This holds for all non-derogable rights bar freedom of 
                                                 
1
 A derogation is the complete or partial elimination of an international obligation (McGoldrick 2004: 
383). 
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religion in the case of autocracies and holds for torture and restrictions to religious 
freedom in the case of anocracies. The ICCPR thus fails to exert a sufficient behavior-
constraining effect where, as in autocracies and anocracies, such an effect would be 
needed most (Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui 2007). 
The next section discusses the derogation provisions in international human 
rights treaties. Section 3 reviews existing studies, section 4 develops theoretical 
expectations on how the human rights situation during derogation periods depends on 
political regime type, which leads to three testable hypotheses. Section 5 explains the 
empirical research design. Section 6 presents the main estimation results and accounts 
for the potential endogeneity of the derogation decision with a Heckman selection 
model, while section 7 reports results from a battery of robustness checks. Given that 
results point toward remarkable differences across regime types, section 8 further dis-
aggregates the democracy and autocracy regime types. 
 
2. Derogating from International Human Rights Treaty Obligations 
From a human rights protection standpoint, at first sight it seems counter-productive 
that state parties are allowed to derogate from observing certain rights whose very 
protection is the purpose of the international treaty. Much like the hotly debated issue 
of reservations to human rights treaties (Neumayer 2007), which can be interpreted as 
a kind of permanent derogation, but typically for specific individual articles of the 
treaty only, temporary derogations during declared states of emergency from all 
obligations bar the ones specified as non-derogable seemingly detract from the value 
and integrity of international human rights treaties (McGoldrick 2004). In fact, 
because derogations have much broader reach than most reservations, any corrosive 
effect on the integrity of the human rights system is likely to be much stronger for 
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derogations than for reservations. The fact that three out of four universal or regional 
general human rights treaties include provisions for derogation suggests that state 
parties either agreed that governments should in fact have the right to derogate under 
specific circumstances as their sovereign right to defend legitimate interests (Hartman 
1981: 22) or thought that allowing for derogations was the only way to gather 
widespread support for the treaty (University of Minnesota, n.d.). 
Yet, due to the inherent tension between human rights protection on the one 
hand and allowance to derogate from the same on the other, unsurprisingly the treaty 
provisions allow derogation only under certain, specified and restrictive conditions. 
For example, Art. 4:1 of the ICCPR specifies derogations as follows:  
 
“In time of public emergency which threatens the life of the nation 
and the existence of which is officially proclaimed, the States 
Parties to the present Covenant may take measures derogating from 
their obligations under the present Covenant to the extent strictly 
required by the exigencies of the situation, provided that such 
measures are not inconsistent with their other obligations under 
international law and do not involve discrimination solely on the 
ground of race, color, sex, language, religion or social origin.” 
 
Moreover, Art. 4:3 requires derogating state parties to immediately inform other state 
parties of the provisions they have derogated from and of the reasons for doing so.2 
They are also required to inform about the date of termination of the derogation. 
                                                 
2
 The Human Rights Committee to the ICCPR has criticized several states for failing to notify apparent 
declared or de facto states of emergency, some of which have subsequently officially derogated (Oraá 
1992: 80). 
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Importantly, Art. 4:2 exempts a range of human rights from the remit of Art. 4:1, such 
that these rights simply cannot be derogated from. The most relevant of these are the 
right to life (Art. 6 of the ICCPR), the right not to be subjected to torture, cruel, 
inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment (Art. 7), the right not to be held in 
slavery or servitude (Art. 8, paras. 1 and 2), the right not to be held guilty of a 
criminal offence that did not constitute such an offence at the time of commission 
(Art. 15), and the rights to freedom of thought, conscience and religion (Art. 18). The 
Human Rights Committee to the ICCPR has attempted to extend this list of non-
derogable rights by arguing that a breach of other rights not explicitly listed in Art. 
4:2 might breach a state party’s other obligations under customary or general 
international law, might breach rights considered as jus cogens (law which may not be 
violated by any state), might breach rights in a way that could never be considered 
proportionate as required by Art. 4:1, or that respect for non-derogable rights is 
impossible to achieve without respecting some other, formally derogable rights (Oraá 
1992: chapter 4; Joseph, Schultz and Castan 2000: 829-831). Since such extensions 
are highly controversial, I restrict the use of the term non-derogable rights to the ones 
explicitly listed in Art 4:2 of the ICCPR. 
The derogation clauses of the European Convention on Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR) and the American Convention on Human Rights 
(ACHR) vary in the specific wording used as well as in the list of non-derogable 
rights, which is more extensive in the case of the ACHR and less extensive in the case 
of the ECHR compared to the ICCPR, but are otherwise very similar in their purpose, 
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structure and specification.3 The African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights is the 
only general international human rights treaty containing no derogation provisions. 
The Human Rights Committee to the ICCPR has suggested that civil and 
international war, but also natural and man-made disasters as well as violent mass 
demonstrations can trigger states of emergency, but that derogations must be officially 
declared, must be of an exceptional and temporary nature, and must also be 
terminated as soon as the life of the nation is no longer under threat (McGoldrick 
2004: 394). 
I focus on derogations to the ICCPR since this is the only universal of the 
three international human rights treaties with derogation provisions.4 In fact, it is 
considered by some as “the primus inter pares of the universal international human 
rights treaties” (McGoldrick 2004: 381). Of note, I analyze the effect of derogations 
officially declared and notified to the UNGS, not the effect of undeclared de facto 
states of emergency, nor the effect of declared states of emergency in non-state parties 
to the ICCPR, nor the effect of declared states of emergency in state parties to the 
ICCPR, for which the government chose not to notify other state parties via the 
                                                 
3
 The more extensive list of non-derogable rights under the ACHR includes rights such as the right to 
marry and to build a family and the right to a name, which are very unlikely to be affected by a state of 
emergency.  
4
 Moreover, as Fitzpatrick (1998: 376f.) points out, derogation notices to the ACHR are not officially 
published. Derogations to the ECHR are listed on its website at 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ListeDeclarations.asp?NT=005&CV=0&NA=&PO=999&C
N=8&VL=1&CM=9&CL=ENG. There was only one instance of a derogation to the ECHR for country 
years relevant to my sample without a corresponding derogation to the ICCPR. In this instance Albania 
notified the withdrawal of a derogation to the ECHR without, however, mentioning when the 
derogation came into effect in the first place. 
8 
UNGS. The reason is that I wish to test for whether the ICCPR’s non-derogability 
clause fulfills its stated purpose, so I need to test whether those governments which 
have chosen to benefit from the legal privilege that Art. 4:1 of the ICCPR affords state 
parties to derogate from all rights not listed in Art. 4:2 obey the requirement not to 
step up violations of the non-derogable rights listed therein. 
 
3. Existing Studies and Their Shortcomings 
To the best of my knowledge, Keith (1999) and Richards and Clay (2010) provide the 
only existing studies that go beyond anecdotal evidence and specifically address 
human rights violations during declared states of emergency.5 In bivariate mean 
comparisons, Keith (1999) finds that if she groups countries officially derogating 
from their ICCPR obligations together with countries that have refused to ratify in the 
first place then the difference in mean personal integrity rights violations between 
state and non-state parties becomes larger and statistically significant. She interprets 
this finding as evidence that “the derogations have a significant impact on personal 
integrity abuse – which includes behavior such as torture, disappearances, and 
political killings – behavior that is not legally excused by derogations” (Keith 1999: 
105, emphasis in original). Richards and Clay (2010) in a multivariate analysis 
similarly find that declared states of emergency – including, but not restricted to those 
officially notified to the ICCPR secretariat – are associated with higher levels of 
                                                 
5
 There is a related literature investigating the effect that explicit domestic constitutional provisions for, 
among others, emergency powers and restrictions on the exercise of such powers have on human rights 
(Davenport 1996; Keith 2002; Keith and Poe 2004). These studies are interesting in their own right, but 
do not address the specific question analyzed in this paper. Moreover, simply because a country’s 
constitution does not explicitly mention the government’s right to declare a state of emergency does not 
imply that they cannot officially declare such a state if they are party to the ICCPR. 
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political imprisonment and greater restrictions on freedom of assembly and 
association, on foreign movement and on electoral self-determination. 
However, for three reasons this topic requires further analysis. First, Keith 
(1999) does not directly address derogations to the ICCPR as such, grouping 
derogators together with non-ratifiers instead, while Richards and Clay (2010) address 
all declared states of emergency, not just derogations to the ICCPR. Many observers 
suggest, based on anecdotal evidence, that states of emergency are bad times for 
human rights protection (Fitzpatrick 1998; Iyer 1999; Joseph, Schultz and Castan 
McGoldrick 2004). When governments feel under threat, as they do when they 
confront a state of emergency, they are unlikely to refrain from violating the human 
rights of their citizens, it is believed, and Richards and Clay’s (2010) analysis partly 
corroborates this suspicion. Yet it is unclear whether this holds true for officially 
declared and notified derogations to the ICCPR as well. Such notification draws the 
attention of other state parties to the derogating state and allows the Human Rights 
Committee (HRC) to the ICCPR to monitor whether the derogating state complies 
with the restrictive conditions derogations are subject to and with the obligation to 
respect the non-derogability of certain rights. Joseph, Schultz and Castan (2000: 836), 
for example, state the hope “that the HRC adopts a vigilant supervisory role in 
assessing all derogation measures (…) in order to help guard against overly 
oppressive emergency measures”. Oraá (1992: 78) suspects that some states refuse to 
officially declare what amounts to a de facto state of emergency exactly for “fear of 
international criticism”. It is therefore worth investigating whether the evidence on 
deteriorating human rights during all states of emergency holds for officially declared 
and notified states of emergency, which automatically draw the attention of outside 
third-parties to the human rights behavior of derogating governments. 
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Second, Keith (1999) and Richards and Clay (2010) do not employ country 
fixed effects in their empirical analysis. Such fixed effects account for any 
unobserved heterogeneity in human rights behavior across countries. They take out all 
level effects between countries (all between-variation) and estimates are based on the 
within- or over-time variation in countries only. If level effects are not taken out of 
the estimations, then all the coefficients of emergency declarations can tell is that, on 
average, country years with such declarations were different from country years 
without such declarations, but across all countries and all times. With country fixed 
effects included, the coefficients of derogation periods will instead tell us whether, on 
average, country years with such declarations were different from country years 
without such declarations, but this time only across time within countries, not across 
countries. In other words, the coefficients in fixed effects models will tell us whether 
derogation periods are systematically different from non-derogation periods within 
countries, which is exactly what one wishes to know. 
Third, while Richards and Clay (2010) control for the direct effect of regime 
type on human rights violations, they do not investigate whether declared states of 
emergency have differential effects in countries with different political regimes. As I 
argue in the next section, theory suggests that political regime type impacts on what 
happens to the human rights situation during derogation periods. 
 
4. Theoretical Expectations 
Political regime type is both theoretically conceptualized and empirically known to 
have a strong effect on human rights violations (Poe 2004; Davenport 2004, 2007a; 
Davenport and Armstrong 2004; Simmons 2009). To be sure, while there is near 
consensus that democracy has a positive effect and autocracy a negative effect on 
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human rights, there is controversy about whether the move from autocracy to 
democracy has a linear or non-linear effect and whether there is a threshold only 
above which democracy exerts its positive effect. Incoherent regime types – often 
called ‘anocracies’ as they are neither clearly autocratic nor fully democratic and 
combine self-contradictory elements of both autocracy and democracy – are 
sometimes considered the worst offenders (Fein 1995; Regan and Henderson 2002), 
but sometimes also the very regimes for which international human rights treaties are 
most likely to make a positive difference to state behavior (Simmons 2009). 
In this section, I will argue that political regime type is also likely to condition 
the effect of derogations on human rights. To see why, it is important to recall what 
derogations do: they officially declare and notify states of emergency. They thus 
fulfill a signaling function: regimes that officially derogate want it to be known that 
they experience a state of emergency. But derogations are likely to fulfill different 
signaling functions in different regime types. As Neumayer (2007) and Hafner-Burton 
et al. (2011) argue, democracies take their international treaty obligations more 
seriously than autocracies and when they invoke flexibility or escape provisions such 
as the derogation provision of the ICCPR they do so because they take their 
commitment to respect human rights seriously. They derogate in order to “buy time 
and legal breathing space to confront crises, while, at the same time, signaling to 
concerned domestic audiences that rights suspensions are temporary and lawful” 
(Hafner-Burton et al. 2011: 675). In other words, in democracies derogations fulfill 
the purpose of signaling to relevant stakeholders – the parliamentary opposition, 
interest groups, civil society and the judiciary – that the country is undergoing a 
temporary state of emergency that will require temporary restrictions on some human 
rights as emergency measures, but that these rights restrictions do not go beyond what 
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is necessary and lawful, as specified by the ICCPR’s derogation clause. Importantly, 
this will not include restrictions to non-derogable rights. As Hafner-Burton et al. 
(2011: 680) point out, exactly because of the officially declared and notified nature of 
derogations, which opens the emergency measures up to scrutiny to the international 
community and the Human Rights Committee to the ICCPR, those critical of the 
temporary human rights restrictions “are more likely to refrain, in the near term, from 
challenging rights-restrictive policies than if the government had adopted those same 
policies without derogating”. 
If derogations fulfill a signaling role in democracies, whose ultimate objective 
is the fostering of support and the dispersion of concern among domestic stakeholders 
for the government’s temporary emergency measures, the signaling function is an 
entirely different one in autocracies. Hollyer and Rosendorff (2011) argue that 
autocracies ratify the UN Convention Against Torture in order to signal to domestic 
opposition groups that they do not intend to comply with the obligation to refrain 
from torture. Instead, they wish to signal a strong commitment to stay in power and 
use, if need comes, even more repressive tactics such as torture in order to fulfill this 
objective. The commitment is credible because the ratification decision increases the 
costs to the autocrat and his ruling elite from being removed from office as after 
ratification they are more likely to be prosecuted for their human rights violations 
than in the absence of ratification. 
The same logic can be applied to derogations. By officially declaring and 
notifying states of emergency, autocratic governments open up their emergency 
measures to public scrutiny by international observers and the Human Rights 
Committee to the ICCPR. They thereby increase the attention paid to their actions and 
the potential costs of stepping up violation of human rights, particularly the non-
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derogable ones. But this is exactly what they wish for in order to signal to their 
domestic audience their commitment to use whatever force and violence required to 
make it through the state of emergency and stay in power. Since autocrats have no 
intention to obey their international human rights treaty obligations and will take all 
necessary means to stay in power, they will not refrain from stepping up human rights 
violations during derogation periods, including violations of officially non-derogable 
rights. In fact, since autocrats wish to increase the costs of leaving office, it is likely 
that they will explicitly not refrain from increasingly violating non-derogable rights 
since violation of these rights increases these costs most. 
Somewhat unclear and ambiguous are theoretical expectations about those 
countries with political regimes outside the two polar cases. Anocracies are neither 
democracies, which take their human rights obligations more seriously than 
autocracies and employ derogations to signal to domestic audiences that emergency 
measures are temporary, necessary, lawful and restricted to derogable rights; nor are 
they autocracies, which step up violations of human rights, including non-derogable 
ones, in order to increase the costs of leaving office and thereby signal to domestic 
audiences their strong commitment to stay in power. Anocracies are regimes in 
between with self-contradictory elements of both polar regime types. But because 
they lack the credibility of democracies for garnering support for their temporary 
emergency measures by signaling that these officially declared and notified measures 
are temporary, strictly necessary and lawful, they lack the incentive to refrain from 
stepping up human rights violations during states of emergency, when the incentives 
for doing so are strongest as they invariably are during states of emergencies 
(Fitzpatrick 1998; Iyer 1999; Joseph, Schultz and Castan McGoldrick 2004). States of 
emergency increase the perception of threat by members of the ruling elite, which is 
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one of the most important reasons identified by Poe (2004) why regimes employ 
human rights violations as part of their attempt to stay in office. 
These theoretical considerations lead to the following set of hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis 1: Democracies may or may not step up violation of derogable 
human rights during derogation periods, but they do not step up 
violation of non-derogable rights. 
Hypothesis 2: Autocracies step up violation of both derogable and non-
derogable human rights during derogation periods. 
Hypothesis 3: Anocracies have fewer incentives than autocracies to step up 
violation of human rights, but lack the self-restraining power of 
democracies and are therefore likely to step up violation of both 
derogable and non-derogable human rights during derogation 
periods. 
 
5. Empirical Research Design 
Information on the dependent variables comes from Cingranelli and Richards (2010a). 
One of the advantages of this dataset over the alternative Political Terror Scale 
measure is that Cingranelli and Richards provide information on specific human 
rights violations rather than merely one aggregate measure.6 Specifically, I will 
analyze the following human rights and human rights violations: 
 
 Extrajudicial killings: the killing of people without due process of law. 
 Torture: the infliction of extreme pain or the use of physical and other force 
that is cruel, inhuman or degrading. 
                                                 
6
 See Cingranelli and Richards (2010b) and Wood and Gibney (2010) for an exchange of arguments on 
the relative merits and disadvantages of each measure. 
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 Freedom of Religion: the freedom to exercise and practice one’s religious 
beliefs. 
 Disappearances: the disappearing of people instigated for political motivation 
without knowledge of their whereabouts. 
 Political imprisonment: the incarceration of people because of their religious, 
political, or other beliefs. 
 Freedom of Assembly and Association: the freedom to assemble and associate 
with others in political parties, trade unions and other groups. 
 Freedom of Movement: the freedom to travel within the country as well as to 
leave and return to the country. 
 Freedom of Speech: the freedom of expression, speech and press freedom. 
 Electoral Self-determination: the freedom of political choice and the right to 
elect the governing bodies. 
 
In all cases, violation of rights must either come from government officials or be 
instigated by government officials. The rights not to be subjected to extrajudicial 
killings, torture and the freedom of religion are explicitly exempted from derogation 
under Art 4:3 of the ICCPR. Note, however, that it is somewhat debatable whether the 
way Cingranelli and Richards (2010a) code freedom of religion truly represents a 
non-derogable right as it refers to the freedom to exercise and practice one’s religious 
beliefs, which may not be fully covered by the non-derogable right to freedom of 
thought, conscience and religion and might be partly derogable instead. 
Disappearances are implicitly covered by the list of exemptions from derogation since 
when victims are not found this will often be because they have been killed or have 
been subjected to torture and the government wishes to conceal this fact by detaining 
the victims at an unknown location without acknowledgement of detention. 
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Alternatively, it may actively employ uncertainty about the fate of disappeared people 
as a weapon of state terror against its citizens. 
The disaggregated specific human rights are all coded as either zero, one or two 
with zero indicating that the exercise of the human right in question was severely 
restricted or denied to all citizens or that relevant human rights violations were 
practiced frequently; one indicating that the exercise of the right was limited for all 
citizens or severely restricted for selected groups or that rights violations occurred 
occasionally; while two indicates full enjoyment of the right by all and that violations 
did not occur. Cingranelli and Richards (2010a) report two measures of freedom of 
movement, one for freedom of domestic, the other for international movement. These 
two measures were combined to one single freedom of movement measure by taking 
the minimum of the two constituent measures. Coding is based principally on US 
State Department Country Reports on Human Rights Practices and for extrajudicial 
killings, torture, disappearances and political imprisonment also on amnesty 
international’s Annual Reports on the State of the World’s Human Rights. 
In addition to these dis-aggregated rights, I will also analyze the following two 
aggregations of specific non-derogable and derogable rights: 
 
 Non-derogable rights index: an additive index (running from 0 to 6) 
constructed from the Torture, Extrajudicial Killings and Disappearance 
indicators. 
 Derogable rights index: an additive index (running from 0 to 10) constructed 
from the Political Imprisonment, Freedom of Assembly and Association, 
Freedom of Movement, Freedom of Speech, and Electoral Self-determination 
indicators. 
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Aggregate measures have the advantage that they capture a more comprehensive 
picture of the state of human rights protection than individual rights do on their own. 
Whether human rights can and should be aggregated into indices is disputed, 
however. McCormick and Mitchell (1997: 513) make the case against aggregation, 
arguing that it confounds rights that are different “in type not just amount”. 
Cingranelli and Richards (1999, 2010b) make the case for aggregation, arguing that 
their Mokken Scaling Analysis suggests they “can confidently sum the scores” (1999: 
410) of the individual rights to their physical integrity rights and empowerment 
indices, which they regard as “empirically-verified unidimensional scales” (2010b: 
411). Since the non-derogable rights index largely overlaps with the physical integrity 
rights index, while the derogable rights index largely overlaps with the empowerment 
index, Cingranelli and Richards’s argument for the aggregation of individual rights 
should carry over to my aggregate indices as well. Given that aggregation is 
contested, however, it is prudent to analyze both rights individually and in 
aggregation, which is what I do. 
The main explanatory variable measures the number of days during a given 
year that a state party to the ICCPR has derogated, if at all, with data taken from 
http://www.unhchr.ch.7 However, results using a dummy variable indicating country 
years with one or more derogations in place instead are reported in the robustness 
section 7. Whilst some derogations are very short-lived, lasting no longer than a 
couple of days, others are much more extensive, lasting several weeks, months or 
even years. 29 countries have derogated at least once from their ICCPR obligations 
                                                 
7
 Since only a minority of derogating governments provided information on which rights they 
derogated from, at this stage no attempt was made to distinguish among different types of derogation. I 
leave this to future research. 
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according to my measure during the period of my study. For derogators, the average 
duration of one or more derogations occurring in one year is around 271 days, with 
little difference between democracies (266 days on average) and anocracies (242 days 
on average), while autocracies tend to take out longer derogations (311 days on 
average). Democracies are responsible for the majority of the 228 country years with 
one or more derogations in place, accounting for 170, 147 and 130 of these country 
years, depending on whether the threshold of democracy is set at a polity2 value of 5, 
6 or 7 – see the discussion on the definition of democracy below. 
For a few instances a termination of the period of derogation could not be 
established since the relevant state party failed to inform other state parties about 
when, if so, the state of emergency has ended.8 The main estimation results presume 
that the open-ended derogation has stayed in place until a new state of emergency was 
declared or until the end of the sample period, whichever is earlier. However, in 
robustness tests results are reported for estimations in which observations with open-
ended derogations are set to missing on the basis that reliable information could not 
be established. 
To test whether any changes to human rights during derogation periods 
systematically depend on the type of political regime, I condition the derogation 
measure on autocracy, anocracy and democracy dummy variables, such that one 
measures derogations in autocracies, one measures derogations in anocracies and the 
last measures derogations in democracies. Employing an exhaustive set of derogation 
                                                 
8
 This applies to the following: Chile 11/03/1976 to 07/09/1986, Ecuador 30/11/1999 to 04/01/2000 
and 17/08/2005 to 20/03/2006, Georgia 07/11/2007 to 31/12/2008 (end of sample period), Guatemala 
28/08/2006 to 16/11/2006, Russian Federation (Soviet Union) 21/09/1988 to 01/11/1991, Sri Lanka 
01/09/1989 to 31/12/2002, Uruguay 30/07/1979 to 31/12/2008 (end of sample period). Note that 
because the sample starts in 1981, Uruguay has no within-variation on the derogation variable. 
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variables covering all regime types (all countries fall into one of these three regime 
type categories) represents an alternative, but exactly equivalent, model specification 
to an interaction effects model, in which the derogation variable would be interacted 
with two of the regime type dummy variables, leaving the third as omitted reference 
category.9 
If my chosen model specification is the exact equivalent of a full interaction 
effect model, then why not estimate the latter? The reason is that my chosen model 
specification is more easily interpreted as it allows me to directly estimate the effect 
of derogations in all political regime types. Moreover, it allows an easy check on 
whether derogations have a systematic effect in a specific political regime type that is 
statistically significantly different from zero, even if the effect may not be statistically 
distinguishable from the effect in other regime types. If, for example, autocracies have 
systematically worse human rights during derogation periods, but anocracies and 
democracies do not react systematically as a group such that the confidence interval 
around their estimated effects are very wide, then the derogation variable will be 
statistically significantly different from zero in autocracies, it will be insignificant in 
anocracies and democracies and, for wide enough confidence intervals in these two 
regime types, the three coefficients will be statistically indistinguishable from each 
other. But even if statistically indistinguishable from each other, the result that 
                                                 
9
 To see this, imagine an estimation model of the form y = b1x+b2z+b3xz, with x a continuous and, for 
simplicity’s sake, z the only conditioning dummy variable. The marginal effect of x on y is given by b1 
for z=0 and by (b1+b3) for z=1. Now consider instead an estimation model of the form y = b4x (for z=0) 
+ b5x (for z=1) + b6z. b4 is the same as b1, while b5 is the same as (b1+b3). In the first model, the 
interaction effect is statistically significant if b3 is statistically significantly different from zero. In the 
second model, it is significant if b4 and b5 are statistically significantly different from each other. 
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autocracies as a group have systematically worse human rights during derogations is 
still important information for the purpose of my research question. 
Much existing evidence suggests that the effect of democracy on human rights 
violation is not smoothly continuous, but instead follows distinct threshold effects 
(Davenport and Armstrong 2004; Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2005). This evidence thus 
corroborates the use of distinct dummy variables. There is, however, controversy on 
what cut-off points should be used to classify regimes into autocracies, anocracies 
and, particularly, democracies. In the main estimations, I define a democracy as 
having a polity2 value of 5 or above, but section 7 reports results from robustness tests 
using cut-off points of 6 or 7 on the polity2 scale, which runs from -10 (most 
autocratic) to 10 (most democratic). For simplicity and to restrict the space of possible 
regime type classifications, I keep the definition of autocracies fixed at a value of 
polity2 of -5 or below. The different cut-off points for democracies imply a global 
share of democracies of roughly 48, 45 or 39 percent of country years, a global share 
of anocracies of roughly 11, 14 or 20 percent of country years and a global share of 
autocracies of roughly 31 percent of country years, respectively.10 
Control variables include categorical measures of the extent of external and 
internal armed conflict, coded between 0 (no conflict), 1 (between 25 and 999 battle-
related deaths in a given year) and 2 (at least 1,000 battle-related deaths in a given 
year) (Gleditsch et al. 2002), anocracy and democracy dummy variable measures of 
political regime type based on polity2 values as described above (Marshall, Jaggers 
and Gurr 2010) with autocracies as the omitted reference category, per capita income 
as a measure of economic development, and population size (both taken from World 
                                                 
10
 The shares of democracies and anocracies are higher in-sample than globally because only countries  
which have ratified the ICCPR enter the sample and these countries are more likely to be state parties. 
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Bank 2010). In addition to this set of control variables, which might be considered 
almost standard in human rights studies (Poe 2004), I include event counts of strikes, 
riots and anti-government demonstrations, taken from Arthur Banks’ Cross-National 
Time-Series Data Archive, as well as a count of natural disaster events, taken from the 
International Disaster Database EM-DAT.11 The purpose of the control variables is to 
comprehensively control for relevant confounding factors. 
I wish to analyze whether the human rights situation within a country is 
systematically worse during derogation periods. I therefore need to take out all level 
effects across countries. Contrary to linear models with a continuous dependent 
variable, simply including country dummy variables does not result in a consistent 
fixed effects estimator (Stata 2003). Baetschmann et al. (2011) have recently 
developed a “Blow-up and Cluster” (BUC) consistent estimator for the fixed effects 
ordered logit model. Every observation is replaced (“blown-up”) by K-1 copies of 
itself (K stands for the number of categories of the dependent variable), every copy is 
dichotomized at a different cutoff point and the entire sample is estimated with a 
conditional logit estimator with standard errors clustered at the country level. Riedl 
and Geishecker (2011) find this estimator to perform as well or even better than any 
of the five different estimation strategies they analyze in their Monte Carlo 
estimations, which is why I use this estimator for the main estimations. For the 
estimations, in which I explicitly account for the endogeneity of the derogation 
decision, I cannot use an ordered logit estimator and instead I use a standard linear 
Heckman selection model. Year-specific dummy variables control for any global 
shocks affecting all countries equally. The estimation model is thus: 
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 http://www.databanksinternational.com/ and http://www.emdat.be/. 
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1 2 3( ) ( ) ( )it i it it ity Derog autocracy Derog anocracy Derog democracyα β β β= + + +  
 4 5it itInternational Armed Conflict Domestic Armed Conflictβ β+ +
 5 6 7 8 .it it it itStrikes Riots Demonstrations Nat Disastersβ β β β+ + + +
 9 10 11 12ln lnit it it itAnocracy Democracy GDPpc Populationβ β β β+ + + +  
 t ituδ+ +          (1) 
 
The sample is restricted to country years from which onwards states have become 
parties to the ICCPR since logically one can only derogate from one’s ICCPR 
obligations if one is a party to the treaty. The sample covers the period 1981 (the 
earliest year for which Cingranelli and Richards (2010a) provide data on human 
rights) to 2008 and up to 130 countries.12 Table 1 presents descriptive summary 
variable statistics. Note, however, that this is based on the sample for the aggregate 
non-derogable rights index and that the sample varies and is smaller for all other 
regressions since the BUC fixed effects ordered logit estimator discards all countries, 
which have no variation over time on the dependent variable. 
 
6. Results 
Table 2 presents the main estimation results. Model 1 refers to the non-derogable 
rights index as dependent variable, while models 2 to 4 refer to, respectively, 
disappearances, extrajudicial killings and torture, the individual components of the 
non-derogable rights index. Model 5 has religious freedom as the dependent variable. 
The human rights situation deteriorates in autocratic states during derogation periods 
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 Note that many of these countries have no within-variation on the derogation variables and have thus 
no impact on the estimated coefficient of the main variables of interest – they do, of course, impact on 
the other estimated coefficients, however.  
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with respect to all non-derogable rights individually and the aggregate non-derogable 
rights index as well. As concerns freedom of religion and torture, there are more 
human rights violations in anocracies during periods of derogations. None of the other 
rights are statistically significantly affected in anocracies and none of these rights 
statistically significantly deteriorate in democracies. Note that for killings the 
confidence intervals around the estimated coefficient for derogation periods in 
anocracies and democracies are so wide that the coefficients are statistically 
indistinguishable from the coefficient in autocracies. Hence, while autocracies 
systematically fare worse, anocracies and democracies as distinct groups do not 
systematically fare worse during derogation periods; the differences across regime 
types are statistically indistinguishable due to the imprecision of estimates in 
anocracies and democracies. The same holds, analogously, for freedom of religion. 
Models 6 to 11 refer to, respectively, the aggregate derogable rights index, 
political imprisonment, freedom of assembly and association, freedom of movement, 
freedom of speech, and electoral self-determination, which are all in principle 
derogable. With the exception of electoral self-determination (which tends to be fully 
restricted even during normal times), all derogable rights statistically significantly 
worsen during derogation periods in autocracies. The same is true for anocracies for 
all derogable rights but the freedom of assembly and the freedom of movement, for 
which the estimated coefficient is also negative, but not statistically distinguishable 
from zero. Whenever derogable human rights deteriorate statistically significantly in 
anocracies, there is no statistically distinguishable difference to the situation in 
autocracies due to the large confidence intervals. Democracies do not statistically 
significantly step up restrictions of any derogable rights during derogation periods. 
However, the confidence interval of the coefficient is large enough for freedom of 
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assembly and for freedom of movement as to be statistically indistinguishable from 
the coefficient in other regime types. This points toward heterogeneity within the 
group of democracies – a point to be addressed in more detail further below in section 
8. 
Coefficients from the fixed effects ordered logit estimator are very difficult to 
interpret substantively. To gauge substantive importance, I have re-estimated table 1 
with a linear fixed effects estimator (results not shown). There is some evidence that 
the bias of this estimator might be small (Ferrer-i-Carbonell and Frijters 2004; Riedl 
and Geishecker 2011) and its results are easy to interpret. Applying a linear fixed 
effects estimator, a derogation that lasts for 242 days, the average duration period in 
anocracies in any one year (not counting derogations that span more than one year), is 
associated with lower respect for the aggregate derogable rights index by 1.6 units. 
For autocracies, an average derogation period of 311 days is associated with lower 
respect for the derogable rights index by 1.1 units and lower respect for the non-
derogable rights index by one unit. Keeping in mind that the derogable and non-
derogable rights indices run from 0 to 10 and from 0 to 6, respectively, these are 
substantively large deteriorations of the human rights situation and for autocracies the 
substantive worsening is stronger for non-derogable rights than it is for derogable 
rights. 
As concerns the control variables, countries experiencing domestic or 
international armed conflict sometimes have worse human rights during such periods. 
Strike, riot, anti-governmental demonstration and natural disaster events have no 
statistically significant effect conditional on the other variables and the country fixed 
effects in the model. Becoming an anocracy or a democracy typically improves the 
human rights situation relative to autocracies, the omitted reference category. For the 
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aggregate derogable rights index, for which there is more variation in the data than for 
the individual rights, the positive effect of becoming a democracy on human rights is 
statistically significantly stronger than the effect of becoming an anocracy, all relative 
to autocracy, the omitted reference category. Per capita income has no consistent 
effect, but one needs to keep in mind that the effect of income is net of the effects of 
democracy and conflict, which are both highly correlated with income – once 
positively, once negatively. A larger population size has a negative effect on human 
rights. 
In table 3, I explicitly account for the potential non-random self-selection 
process into derogations with a Heckman selection model, which accounts for the 
process of whether an ICCPR state party has ever derogated from its obligations over 
the period of study. The identifying assumptions are that the potential non-random 
processes of ratification of the ICCPR and any impact of governmental behavior on 
states of emergency themselves can be neglected in my analysis, such that I can 
exclusively concentrate on the non-random process of derogation. Heckman selection 
models are unreliable if there is no variable fulfilling the exclusion restriction. I use 
the existence of an actual state of emergency during a country year as this variable, 
with data from Hafner-Burton et al. (2011). The additional identifying assumption is 
that actual states of emergency have a strong effect on the decision to derogate and 
that, conditional on the other control variables in the second stage of the estimations, 
the existence of a state of emergency has no direct effect on human rights. 
Given these identifying assumptions, table 4 shows that accounting for the 
non-random process of derogating does not change the main results. Autocracies 
significantly step up violation of the non-derogable rights index – that the effect is not 
significant for the individual rights could be because the linear Heckman model is less 
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appropriate for the three-category individual rights dependent variable than for the 
seven-category aggregate index. Autocracies also step up violations of derogable 
rights, as do in some cases anocracies. Democracies never experience a statistically 
significant deterioration of any human rights during derogation periods, with the 
exception of electoral self-determination.  
For reasons of space constraints, I cannot discuss the first or selection stage 
results in detail. However, of note, actual states of emergency are a statistically 
significant predictor of derogations (with large z-values, not shown in table for 
reasons of space). This makes this variable a suitable candidate for the first stage. 
Also, in line with Hafner-Burton (2011) and my theoretical expectations, democracies 
are much more likely to officially declare and notify a state of emergency (i.e., 
derogate) than either anocracies or autocracies.13 
The results so far paint a clear picture. Autocracies systematically step up 
violations not only of derogable rights, but also of non-derogable rights, thereby 
violating the letter and spirit of the ICCPR’s derogation provision by increasingly 
violating non-derogable rights, which would suggest that the ICCPR does not exert 
the constraining effect on autocracies during states of emergency it is supposed to 
have for these rights. This is consistent with my second hypothesis. Anocracies with 
their combination of contradictory elements from a more autocratic and a more 
democratic political regime fare better than autocracies in that they do not resort to 
increasingly violating non-derogable rights other than torture and restrictions to 
freedom of religion, but at the same time fare worse than democracies as concerns 
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  Hafner-Burton et al. (2011) also argue that judicial independence affects the derogation 
decision. I do not include this variable here as its inclusion leads to a significant loss of observations 
due to missing data. However, results are robust and available on request. 
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derogable rights, which experience no statistically significant deterioration of any 
human right during derogation periods, with the possible exception of electoral self-
determination. These results are in line with my first and third hypotheses. 
One of the theoretical arguments developed in section 4 was that autocracies 
not only know that official derogations attract international scrutiny, but that they 
welcome such scrutiny as it helps them to strengthen the signal they wish to send to 
their domestic audience. To be sure: they may on the surface of things denounce such 
scrutiny as unjustified interference in their own domestic business, but they need such 
scrutiny to render their signal more credible. This can only work if derogating 
autocracies do in fact receive increased attention for their human rights behaviour. 
Average marginal effects reported in table 4 indicate that autocracies which derogate 
from their ICCPR obligations are more likely to be targeted by the UN Commission 
on Human Rights over the period 1981 to 2000 (model 1) and also targeted by a 
stronger measure (model 2) ranging from discussion, to a confidential measure, 
advisory measure to a public resolution, using data taken from Lebovic and Voeten 
(2006). Note that this is despite controlling for the level of respect for human rights in 
these countries. These results would suggest that the autocracies which derogate from 
their ICCPR obligations get what they seek. 
 
7. Robustness 
In this section I explore the robustness of my findings, which can be found in the 
online Appendix available at this journal’s webpage. The first three rows of online 
appendix table 1 report results for the various human rights analyzed for models that 
include the lagged dependent variable. To save space, results on the control variables 
are not reported and the standard errors of the derogation variables are also not 
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shown. The coefficient of the derogation variable in autocracies becomes insignificant 
for killings as does the coefficient in anocracies for freedom of religion, but 
derogations in anocracies are now also associated with increased restrictions on the 
freedom of assembly. Otherwise, results on the effect of derogations are fully 
consistent with the results from models without the lagged dependent variable 
included. 
The next three rows report estimated coefficients where derogations are 
measured by a simple dummy variable for country years in which derogations took 
place. The coefficient of the derogation variable in autocracies becomes insignificant 
for disappearances and freedom of assembly as does the coefficient in anocracies for 
freedom of religion, but country years with at least one derogation in place always see 
significantly worse derogable rights on all dimensions in anocracies. There is a 
statistically significant deterioration in democracies, but only for the aggregate 
derogable rights index. Otherwise, results are consistent with the ones reported in 
table 2. 
The next six rows report results from models, which employ again the 
continuous measure of derogation days in a country year, but – given the stark 
contrast between regime types – test for the effect of altering the threshold from 
which onwards a country is declared a democracy to 6 and 7 on the polity2 scale, 
respectively. There is not much difference to the main results if democracies need to 
score 6 or higher or even 7 or higher. There is a surprising result for extrajudicial 
killings, the state of which worsens in democracies during derogation periods if 
democracies need to score 7 or higher on polity2. This result needs to be taken with 
caution, however, since most democracies in this category have no or almost no 
variation on this variable (i.e., do not engage in such killings) and closer inspection of 
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the data shows that the statistically significant coefficient is almost entirely due to the 
United Kingdom, which according to Cingranelli and Richards (2010a) engaged 
several times in such practices on the coding level of 1 during its two long derogation 
periods from 1981 to 1984 and 1988 to 2005. 
In the next three rows results are reported from models, in which country years 
of open-ended derogations have been set to missing on the basis that one cannot 
establish with certainty whether a derogation has still been in place or not. Results are 
consistent with those reported in table 2, suggesting that the main results are not 
driven by a potential mis-coding of open-ended derogations. 
Another concern is that countries may switch their political regime during 
periods of derogation. After all, some of the derogable rights such as freedom of 
assembly and association or electoral self-determination are constitutive components 
of Polity’s definition of democracy. Is the reason why I find that, on the whole, 
democracies do not increasingly violate human rights during derogation periods 
because they become anocracies or autocracies during such periods? Plausible as this 
concern is in principle, there are only five country years during derogation periods in 
which countries slipped from democracy to anocracy or to autocracy according to any 
of the thresholds used for defining a democracy above.14 Regime transition is 
therefore unlikely to drive the results, which is confirmed by the last three rows of 
online Appendix table 1, in which derogation periods are dropped from the analysis in 
which regime transitions toward an autocratic regime occurred, using the most 
exacting definition of democracy of a polity2 value of 7 or above.  
                                                 
14
 These are Ecuador in 2000, Georgia in 2007, Nepal in 2002, Sudan in 1989 and Serbia/Montenegro 
in 2003. Nepal and Sudan became autocracies, the other countries (marginally) slipped into the 
anocracy category. 
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In online Appendix table 2, I investigate whether it is really regime type that 
matters or whether results might be driven by whether countries have a domestic 
judiciary with the power to rule on executive acts, the extent to which they are 
generally domestically subject to the rule of law as well as the strength of domestic 
civil society, defined as the number of international non-governmental organizations 
with domestic participation relative to population size. All three factors represent 
alternative theoretical hypotheses of why some countries might step up human rights 
violations during derogation periods while others do not (Roy Chowdhury 1989; Cole 
2003; Powell and Staton 2009). Data are taken from the Binghamton University’s 
Institutions and Elections Project,15 from the International Country Risk Guide16 and 
from Wiik (2002). For the dummy variable capturing the presence of a judiciary I 
report the effect of derogations in the two groups of countries similar to the 
presentation of differences in political regime type, whereas for the rule of law and 
civil society strength variables I need to employ a traditional interaction effect model 
since in these cases both interacting variables are continuous. The results suggest it is 
simply not the case that countries with a court with power to rule on executive acts 
systematically differ from countries without such a court during periods of derogation. 
To start with, the existence of such a court has no significantly separating effect on 
derogation periods for non-derogable rights. For derogable rights, sometimes 
countries with such a court fare better during derogation periods than countries 
without such a court, but at other times the reverse is the case. Moreover, with one 
exception the difference is never statistically significant and where it is, as is the case 
for freedom from political imprisonment, it is in fact the countries with an 
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 www2.binghamton.edu/political-science/institutions-and-elections-project.html. 
16
 www.prsgroup.com. 
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independent court that fare worse, rather than the opposite. Similarly, while a better 
rule of law mitigates the worsening of human rights during derogation periods for 
freedom from political imprisonment and restrictions to freedom of speech, there is no 
evidence for such a mitigating effect for the other human rights. The presence of a 
strong civil society also does not seem to consistently result in improved human rights 
conditions during derogation periods. 
 
8. Dis-aggregating Democracy and Autocracy 
What the results from the robustness tests imply is that it is really political regime 
type that matters, not the presence of a court with power to rule on executive acts, nor 
general rule of law nor civil society strength. In this section, I dis-aggregate 
democracy and autocracy further in order to examine different aspect of their 
respective regime types. 
Given how remarkably different democracies are from anocracies and 
autocracies in their human rights behavior during periods of derogation, I first take a 
closer look at democracies. Another reason for doing so derives from the observation 
that the derogation variable in democracies is estimated almost invariably with a 
negative coefficient sign (indicating a deterioration of human rights), even if it never 
reaches conventional levels of statistical significance. This could be because of large 
variation among democracies in their behavior, which would lead to large standard 
errors of the estimations. Similar to Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2005), I look at the 
most important and relevant sub-components that make up the aggregate democracy 
and autocracy scales of the polity2 variable. Roughly speaking, the executive 
constraints variable XCONST measures whether there are limits on discretion in the 
executive’s decision-making, whereas the competitiveness of participation and 
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regulation of participation variables PARCOMP and PARREG together with the 
competitiveness of executive recruitment variable XRCOMP measure the existence of 
truly competitive multi-party elections. Note that whilst the existence of an 
independent judiciary affects the coding of the XCONST variable, it only plays a 
minor role, being predominantly focused instead on constraints imposed by the 
legislature. It thus measures something distinct from an independent judiciary. I 
generate two separate dummy variables, one is set to one if countries achieve the 
highest value on the seven-step XCONST dimension, the other is set to one if they 
achieve, simultaneously, the highest value on the six-step PARCOMP dimension or 
on the five-step PARREG dimension and the highest value on the four-step XRCOMP 
measure.17 About 62 percent of democratic country years with a polity2 value of 5 or 
above achieve the highest value of XCONST, whereas about 42 percent of these 
country years fall into the highest categories of PARCOMP/PARREG and XRCOMP. 
Table 5 reports results on dis-aggregating democracies in this way. Note that 
because the BUC maximum likelihood estimator failed to converge for some human 
rights, these results (as well as the results in table 6 reported further below on dis-
aggregating autocracies) are based on a linear rather than ordered logit fixed effects 
estimator. Results reported in table 5 suggest that the presence or absence of truly 
competitive multi-party elections is no separating factor by which democracies differ 
in the effect of derogations on human rights. If anything, democracies with truly 
competitive mutli-party elections possibly fare worse during derogation periods on 
extrajudicial killings and the aggregate derogable rights index. In contrast, the 
presence or absence of the highest level of executive constraints does matter. 
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 PARCOMP and PARREG are extremely highly correlated with each other. All country years with 
the highest score on PARCOMP also carry the highest score on PARREG. 
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Democracies with the highest constraints on its executive never experience a 
worsening of any of the human rights, while democracies without the highest 
constraints experience more political imprisonment, more restrictions on electoral 
self-determination, a lower aggregate derogable rights index and also more torture 
during derogation periods. One interpretation of this evidence is that a lack of the 
highest level of constraints on executive decision-making allows governments in 
democracies to increasingly resort to human rights violations during officially 
declared and notified states of emergency. 
Interestingly, Keith (2002), Bueno de Mesquita et al. (2005) and Davenport 
(2007b) find that competitive multi-party elections are most important in improving 
human rights. My findings do not contradict these earlier studies. Firstly, with one 
exception the direct effect of truly competitive multi-party elections on human rights 
is positive on all rights and statistically significant in eight out of eleven estimations. 
In contrast, the highest level of executive constraints only has a significantly positive 
human rights effect in two estimations. Secondly, I analyze the fate of human rights 
during specific periods, namely officially declared and notified states of emergency. 
What my results suggest is that while multi-party competition is most important for 
improvements in human rights generally, it is the lack of the highest level of 
executive constraints that allows democracies to engage in some forms human rights 
abuse during such derogation periods. 
As a final step of the analysis, I now account for heterogeneity among 
autocracies. Autocratic regimes have been found to increasingly violate both 
derogable and, importantly, non-derogable rights during declared states of emergency, 
but autocracies strongly differ in the way in which they organize and execute 
authoritarian rule, which is likely to affect their human rights behavior as well. 
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Davenport (2007c), based on prior work by Barbara Geddes, distinguishes among 
seven categories of autocracies. I cannot use these many categories since only a 
minority of autocracy country years have derogations in place such that categories 
would be empty or filled by only few observations. However, Davenport (2007c) 
finds single-party autocratic governments to be least repressive of all rights and 
military governments to be most repressive of physical integrity rights. He argues that 
this finding is roughly in line with what one would theoretically expect, given that 
single-party regimes offer some form of political venue in which individuals can get 
involved politically, thereby reducing the need for repression, whereas military 
governments are not only closer to ‘personalist’ dictatorships without such a venue, 
but also have the training and skills to repress.18  
In table 6, I therefore examine whether autocracies with military-led 
governments differ from other autocracies and whether autocracies with single-party 
systems differ from other autocracies during derogation periods. In six regressions, 
autocracies with military governments experience a statistically significant worsening 
of human rights during derogation periods, whereas this is only once the case in 
autocracies without such governments. For single-party systems the picture is less 
clear-cut, but in autocracies without single-party systems there is more evidence for a 
statistically significant worsening of human rights during derogation periods than in 
single-party autocratic systems. Where coefficients are significant in both types of 
autocratic rule, the effect in autocracies without single-party systems is typically 
stronger, even if the difference is not statistically significant. All in all, table 6 
suggests that autocracies with military governments and autocracies without single-
party systems are the worst offenders of human rights, including non-derogable ones, 
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 Davenport (2007c: 491) notes that the latter part of the argument is controversial. 
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during derogation periods. At the same time, I find military governments to be less 
engaged in extrajudicial killings and more respective of the freedom of speech and the 
aggregate derogable rights index than other autocracies during “normal” times. As 
Davenport (2007c: 491) notes, military governments might be in less need of 
repression outside derogation periods given that citizens “know that the government 
could and is well prepared to use repressive behaviour”. 
 
9. Conclusion 
Do governments step up human rights violations when they derogate from their 
obligation to protect the rights they have committed to at the time of ratifying the 
ICCPR? This paper’s analysis has shown that the answer to this question crucially 
depends on the type of political regime in place. The human rights situation does not 
statistically significantly worsen during periods of derogation from ICCPR 
obligations in democracies, even though democracies account for the majority of 
derogation instances. Things are different in anocracies and autocracies, however. 
Anocracies tend to step up violation of derogable rights as well as restrictions to 
freedom of religion and increasingly engage in torture, while autocracies increasingly 
violate both derogable and non-derogable rights with few exceptions. When 
autocracies derogate, they mean business and they increasingly violate even the 
human rights that should be non-derogable. The same is true, to some extent, for 
anocracies. These results are robust to accounting for the process that leads to 
derogation, different model specifications, different operationalizations of the 
derogation variable and different thresholds for the definition of a democracy. 
What can be inferred from the findings of this article? First, the ICCPR does 
not exert a sufficient constraining effect on autocracies. The fact that autocracies and 
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anocracies increasingly violate non-derogable rights shows that the ICCPR does not 
achieve the objective of its Art. 4:2, namely to protect certain rights from the 
discretion of derogating state parties. Second, whether the ICCPR has a constraining 
effect on democracies depends on how plausible one finds the identifying 
assumptions that go into the Heckman selection model. Actual states of emergency 
strongly affect the likelihood of derogation, but not perfectly so. Some democratic 
governments of ICCPR state parties intending to violate human rights do not officially 
declare and notify a state of emergency to the ICCPR, even though they experience 
events that would legally require them to do so. A good example is the United States. 
Having ratified the ICCPR in 1992, it has not derogated from its obligations after the 
9/11 attacks. Yet, it seems to justify its detention and interrogation practices and its 
more or less acknowledged practice of making people disappear with recourse to a 
rhetoric of a state of a “public emergency which threatens the life of the nation”, just 
as specified by Art. 4:1 of the ICCPR.19 Similarly, while some democracies such as 
Israel, Sri Lanka and the UK have taken out derogations, others who are similarly 
faced with secessionist armed conflicts such as India and Turkey have not. It is 
unclear how representative these examples are. Given that the majority of derogations 
are taken out by democracies suggests that democracies on the whole take seriously 
their obligation to declare states of emergencies. 
If democracies were constrained by the ICCPR’s non-derogation clause, it is 
still unclear what the causal mechanism is. The analysis presented in table 5 explored 
two possibilities by dis-aggregating the democratic regime type, namely whether it is 
constraints on the executive or the presence of truly competitive multi-party elections 
                                                 
19
 Cingranelli and Richards (2010a) downgrade the US on Extrajudicial Killings from 2 to 1 from 2004 
onwards, from 1 to 0 on Torture in 2005 and 2006 and from 2 to 1 on Disappearances in 2004. 
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that matter for the human rights behavior of democracies during periods of 
derogations. The results suggest that if the democratic government is not fully 
constrained in its decision-making by other policy-relevant actors then derogable 
rights such as freedom from political imprisonment, the right to electoral self-
determination as well as the aggregate derogable rights index, but also freedom from 
torture may suffer during derogation periods. By contrast, whether a government can, 
in principle at least, be penalized for gross violations of human rights by bringing 
another government into power in truly competitive multi-party elections does not 
seem to matter. One possible reason is that voters may often reward “tough” leaders 
despite human rights violations if they are widely regarded as dealing successfully 
with the state of emergency. 
The results reported here suggest an apparent paradox of any potentially 
behavior-constraining effect of the ICCPR: where such an effect would be needed 
most, as in autocracies and anocracies, it is absent. Possibly, external watchdogs could 
try and prevent these regimes from stepping up human rights violations during 
derogation periods. International civil society groups such as amnesty international or 
Human Rights Watch can employ naming and shaming (Hafner-Burton 2008), but 
have no recourse to more forceful means. They can, however, also link up with 
domestic civil society groups, with the media or even nation-states to form 
transnational advocacy networks that can put pressure on human rights violators 
(Keck and Sikkink 1998). Note, however, that the results reported in robustness tests 
suggest that the presence of a strong domestic civil society is not enough to deter 
governments from human rights violations during derogation periods. 
In principle, the Human Rights Committee to the ICCPR is supposed to 
monitor whether derogating state parties comply with the restrictive conditions under 
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which rights can be derogated from and with the obligation to continue to respect non-
derogable rights. In practice, critics argue it is often akin to a dog that only barks little 
and bites even less. The same is said of the UN Human Rights Council (formerly UN 
Commission on Human Rights (UNCHR)), even if there is some evidence that it has 
become less partisan and politically motivated over time (Lebovic and Voeten 2006). 
As shown in section 6, the UNCHR perfectly understands that autocracies which 
derogate from their ICCPR obligations require special scrutiny and act accordingly. 
Yet, the results show that such targeting does not prevent derogating autocracies from 
stepping up violations of human rights, including non-derogable ones, during 
derogation periods. Of course, if my theoretical argument, based on an extension of 
Hollyer and Rosendorff (2011), is correct that derogating autocracies welcome such 
scrutiny as it helps them strengthen the signal of commitment to ride through the state 
of emergency and stay in office, then the simultaneous presence of increased scrutiny 
and increased human rights violations is entirely unsurprising. 
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Table 1. Descriptive summary variable statistics. 
 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Non-derogable rights index 2684 3.709 1.704 0 6 
Disapp. 2684 1.294 0.768 0 2 
Killings 2684 0.723 0.718 0 2 
Torture 2684 1.692 0.606 0 2 
Rel. freed. 2664 1.387 0.771 0 2 
Derogable rights index 2676 6.203 3.210 0 10 
Imprisonment 2682 1.191 0.832 0 2 
Assembly 2679 1.272 0.783 0 2 
Movement 2684 1.295 0.790 0 2 
Speech 2684 1.137 0.714 0 2 
Electoral self-determination 2683 1.308 0.788 0 2 
Derogations (days) 2684 20.778 81.442 0 365 
Derogations (dummy) 2684 0.077 0.267 0 1 
International armed conflict 2684 0.018 0.163 0 2 
Domestic armed conflict 2684 0.216 0.516 0 2 
Strike events 2684 0.153 0.533 0 6 
Riot events 2684 0.326 1.379 0 26 
Anti-gov. demonstrations 2684 0.578 1.387 0 15 
Natural disaster events 2684 4.784 10.778 0 182 
Anocracy 2684 0.193 0.394 0 1 
Democracy 2684 0.637 0.481 0 1 
ln GDP p.c. 2684 7.574 1.582 4.395 10.662 
ln Population 2684 16.227 1.346 13.331 20.854 
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Table 2. Main estimation results. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
 
Non-derogable 
rights index Disapp. Killings Torture Rel. freed. 
Derogable 
rights index Imprisonment Assembly Movement Speech Electoral 
derogations in autocracies -0.00802*** -0.00399*** -0.00739** -0.479*** -0.00344 -0.00951*** -0.566*** -0.0160*** -0.00787** -0.225*** -0.00130 
 [0.00163] [0.00145] [0.00311] [0.0659] [0.00264] [0.00347] [0.0589] [0.00404] [0.00369] [0.0818] [0.00457] 
derogations in anocracies -0.000794 0.00125 0.00278 -0.0787*** -0.00846*** -0.00945** -0.409*** -0.0501 -0.0100 -0.337*** -0.421*** 
 [0.00339] [0.00265] [0.00696] [0.00635] [0.00325] [0.00374] [0.0314] [0.0326] [0.00927] [0.0351] [0.0313] 
derogations in democracies 0.000306 3.87e-05 -0.00223 -0.00103 0.00203 -0.00234 -0.00210 -0.000846 -0.00194 0.000493 -0.00285 
 [0.00168] [0.00160] [0.00186] [0.00239] [0.00159] [0.00165] [0.00263] [0.00207] [0.00184] [0.00140] [0.00243] 
international armed conflict -0.630 -0.467 -0.338 -18.80*** 0.278 -0.335 -0.927 -0.824 -0.414 -17.89*** -0.940 
 [0.663] [0.504] [1.113] [0.730] [0.644] [0.771] [1.999] [0.894] [0.765] [0.643] [1.709] 
domestic armed conflict -1.171*** -1.282*** -0.607* 0.209 -0.162 -0.360 -0.225 -0.166 -0.285 -0.274 0.468* 
 [0.342] [0.338] [0.357] [0.381] [0.206] [0.236] [0.308] [0.251] [0.315] [0.333] [0.267] 
strike events -0.0602 0.0901 -0.0960 0.0662 -0.0524 -0.186 -0.122 -0.134 0.275 -0.207 -0.141 
 [0.125] [0.164] [0.148] [0.229] [0.150] [0.125] [0.154] [0.163] [0.212] [0.146] [0.132] 
riot events 0.0156 0.107* -0.0929 -0.122 -0.0486 0.0953** -0.0909 0.0994 0.370*** -0.0434 0.00821 
 [0.0744] [0.0636] [0.0856] [0.0868] [0.0603] [0.0477] [0.0759] [0.0722] [0.0973] [0.0650] [0.0567] 
anti-government demonstr. 0.00796 0.0483 -0.0610 0.205* 0.103 -0.0272 -0.0121 -0.0807 -0.0681 -0.0269 0.0207 
 [0.0413] [0.0574] [0.0658] [0.106] [0.0701] [0.0411] [0.0552] [0.0693] [0.0796] [0.0674] [0.0821] 
natural disaster events 0.00209 0.00942 0.00188 0.000408 -0.0670*** 0.0172 0.00556 -0.0127 0.0440** -0.0207 0.0309 
 [0.0112] [0.0198] [0.0194] [0.0316] [0.0206] [0.0133] [0.00768] [0.0284] [0.0216] [0.0262] [0.0217] 
anocracy 0.0553 -0.554 0.668 1.975** 0.940* 1.964*** 1.067* 3.284*** 2.408** 5.327*** 3.274*** 
 [0.368] [0.474] [0.422] [0.804] [0.555] [0.532] [0.608] [0.785] [1.004] [1.343] [0.860] 
democracy 0.554 -0.239 0.396 1.375 1.863** 3.467*** 1.237* 3.771*** 2.354*** 5.746*** 4.317*** 
 [0.403] [0.465] [0.483] [1.246] [0.753] [0.458] [0.658] [0.753] [0.860] [1.422] [0.861] 
ln GDP p.c. 0.0231 -0.855 0.178 -1.737* -1.528** -0.422 -0.00639 -0.931 -1.213 1.460 0.603 
 [0.683] [0.808] [0.644] [0.969] [0.733] [0.597] [0.543] [0.882] [0.892] [0.916] [0.876] 
ln population 0.576 -2.464 -0.998 -3.877* -0.709 -4.245*** -2.274 -3.313* -11.61*** -4.332** -3.162* 
 [1.265] [2.213] [1.104] [2.246] [1.877] [1.280] [1.468] [1.721] [2.668] [1.803] [1.790] 
Countries 130 85 96 64 93 129 91 84 68 86 89 
Pseudo R-squared 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.27 0.13 0.22 0.11 0.22 0.26 0.21 0.26 
 
Note: Fixed effects ordered logit estimator. Standard errors adjusted for clustering on countries in parentheses.  
* significant at .1 level  ** at .05 level  *** at .01 level. 
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Table 3. Accounting for the process of derogation. 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
 
Non-derogable 
rights index Disapp. Killings Torture Rel. freed. 
Derogable 
rights index Imprisonment Assembly Movement Speech Electoral 
derogations in autocracies -0.00214*** -0.00103 -0.000162 -0.000923-0.000727 -0.00765*** -0.000833 -0.00219*** -0.00132** -0.00106*** -0.00192*** 
derogations in anocracies 0.000756 0.000608 0.000331 -0.000181-0.00168* -0.00826*** -0.00150** -0.00205*** -0.00197* -0.000471 -0.00204*** 
derogations in democracies -0.000314 5.66e-05 -0.000185 -0.000203 0.000298 -0.00128 -3.57e-05 -0.000248 -0.000269 3.30e-05 -0.000462** 
international armed conflict 0.00422 -0.0838 0.0404 0.0389 0.0108 -3.747** -1.424*** -0.884** -0.224 -0.721* -0.697 
domestic armed conflict -0.709*** -0.462*** -0.202** -0.0467 0.00513 -0.243 0.0417 0.0141 -0.0252 -0.0970 0.00618 
strike events -0.00433 0.0319 0.0206 -0.0601** 0.00617 -0.128 0.00124 0.00882 0.0174 -0.0231 -0.0589** 
riot events 0.0101 0.0301 -0.00644 -0.0121 -0.00165 0.0272 -0.00881 0.000274 0.0225** -0.0105 0.00514 
anti-government demonstr. 0.122*** 0.0614*** 0.0354** 0.0241 0.0287 0.0492 0.0541*** -0.0117 0.0129 0.0256 0.00299 
natural disaster events 0.000181 -0.00352 0.00336 -0.000311 -0.00952 -0.0366** -0.0214** -0.00592 -0.00693 -0.00317 -0.00371 
anocracy 0.142 -0.115 0.131 0.147 -0.144 0.0264 0.165 -0.228 -0.106 0.166 -0.0168 
democracy 0.966*** 0.191 0.401*** 0.385** 0.157 2.348*** 0.827*** 0.278* 0.308* 0.486*** 0.623*** 
ln GDP p.c. 0.529 -0.325 0.677** 0.208 -0.360 -0.126 -0.306 0.0555 0.0382 -0.0375 0.0960 
ln population 1.365 -0.281 0.698 1.010** 1.166 -1.876 -0.722 0.538 -0.885** -1.306** 0.534 
            
Selection stage:            
international armed conflict -1.277** -1.299** -1.266** -1.279** -1.296** -1.294** -1.295** -1.284** -1.325*** -1.296** -1.293** 
domestic armed conflict 0.685*** 0.713*** 0.675*** 0.696*** 0.705*** 0.697*** 0.666*** 0.702*** 0.715*** 0.701*** 0.704*** 
strike events 0.366*** 0.367*** 0.376*** 0.378*** 0.386*** 0.381*** 0.377*** 0.380*** 0.373*** 0.379*** 0.382*** 
riot events -0.0829* -0.0848* -0.0860* -0.0887* -0.0887* -0.0884* -0.0876* -0.0905* -0.0888* -0.0870* -0.0900* 
anti-government demonstr. 0.139*** 0.140*** 0.139*** 0.144*** 0.142*** 0.141*** 0.140*** 0.145*** 0.143*** 0.143*** 0.145*** 
natural disaster events -0.0275** -0.0273* -0.0275** -0.0275** -0.0274** -0.0273** -0.0282** -0.0280** -0.0277** -0.0274** -0.0274** 
anocracy -0.199 -0.224 -0.205 -0.227 -0.216 -0.228 -0.216 -0.231 -0.228 -0.227 -0.233 
democracy 0.909*** 0.904*** 0.917*** 0.910*** 0.930*** 0.902*** 0.912*** 0.906*** 0.917*** 0.912*** 0.914*** 
ln GDP p.c. 0.154* 0.152* 0.154* 0.152* 0.150* 0.153* 0.155* 0.154* 0.147* 0.151* 0.150* 
ln population -0.0667 -0.0677 -0.0675 -0.0697 -0.0695 -0.0680 -0.0589 -0.0682 -0.0661 -0.0694 -0.0700 
state of emergency dummy 0.906*** 0.885*** 0.921*** 0.895*** 0.892*** 0.911*** 0.923*** 0.895*** 0.879*** 0.888*** 0.888*** 
Observations/uncensored 2,620/612 2,620/612 2,620/612 2,620/612 2,618/610 2,618/610 2,618/610 2,620/612 2,620/612 2,620/612 2,620/612 
Wald-test indep. equations 0.0019 0.1266 0.0000 0.4992 0.1940 0.0000 0.0000 0.0454 0.0073 0.1058 0.2585 
 
Note: Heckman selection model with fixed effects in second stage. Standard errors adjusted for clustering. Only coefficients shown. 
significant at .1 level  ** at .05 level  *** at .01 level.
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Table 4. Estimation results for UNCHR targeting. 
 
 model 1 model 2 
 UNCHR UNCHR targeting strength 
 targeting none discussed conf. meas. adv. meas. publ. res. 
derogations in autocracies 0.000953*** -0.000653*** 0.000100** 6.69e-05** 0.000143* 0.000343*** 
 
[0.000275] [0.000195] [4.62e-05] [3.05e-05] [7.50e-05] [9.23e-05] 
derogations in anocracies 0.000172 -0.000183 2.81e-05 1.87e-05 4.00e-05 9.60e-05 
 
[0.000332] [0.000406] [6.25e-05] [4.17e-05] [8.77e-05] [0.000217] 
derogations in democracies 3.18e-05 -6.64e-05 1.02e-05 6.81e-06 1.45e-05 3.49e-05 
 
[0.000223] [0.000256] [3.94e-05] [2.64e-05] [5.50e-05] [0.000136] 
non-derogable rights index -0.0351*** 0.0374*** -0.00573*** -0.00383** -0.00817** -0.0196*** 
 
[0.00983] [0.0100] [0.00165] [0.00161] [0.00383] [0.00641] 
derogable rights index -0.0151* 0.0165* -0.00254* -0.00170* -0.00362 -0.00869 
 
[0.00897] [0.00939] [0.00133] [0.000942] [0.00232] [0.00565] 
international armed conflict 0.0807* -0.105** 0.0161** 0.0108* 0.0230 0.0552* 
 
[0.0461] [0.0502] [0.00777] [0.00550] [0.0145] [0.0286] 
domestic armed conflict 0.0240 -0.0271 0.00416 0.00278 0.00593 0.0142 
 
[0.0253] [0.0267] [0.00384] [0.00254] [0.00626] [0.0148] 
strike events -0.0170 0.0156 -0.00240 -0.00160 -0.00342 -0.00821 
 
[0.0149] [0.0147] [0.00228] [0.00163] [0.00359] [0.00773] 
riot events -0.00208 0.00197 -0.000302 -0.000202 -0.000430 -0.00103 
 
[0.00587] [0.00608] [0.000938] [0.000620] [0.00132] [0.00323] 
anti-government demonstr. 0.0187*** -0.0210*** 0.00322*** 0.00215** 0.00459** 0.0110*** 
 
[0.00706] [0.00672] [0.00121] [0.000933] [0.00233] [0.00397] 
natural disaster events 0.00210** -0.00200** 0.000307** 0.000205* 0.000438 0.00105** 
 
[0.000816] [0.000867] [0.000153] [0.000115] [0.000278] [0.000440] 
anocracy -0.0452 0.0499 -0.00766 -0.00512 -0.0109 -0.0262 
 
[0.0450] [0.0472] [0.00696] [0.00492] [0.00986] [0.0270] 
democracy -0.0428 0.0440 -0.00676 -0.00451 -0.00963 -0.0231 
 
[0.0652] [0.0680] [0.0105] [0.00725] [0.0142] [0.0368] 
ln GDP p.c. 0.00819 -0.0132 0.00202 0.00135 0.00288 0.00693 
 
[0.0169] [0.0184] [0.00259] [0.00172] [0.00416] [0.0102] 
ln population -0.0375* 0.0384* -0.00589* -0.00394 -0.00840 -0.0202* 
 
[0.0214] [0.0223] [0.00331] [0.00241] [0.00688] [0.0114] 
Observations 1666 1666 1666 1666 1666 1666 
Countries 123 123 123 123 123 123 
Pseudo R-squared 0.23 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 0.18 
 
Note: Year-specific fixed effects included. Estimator is logit in model 1 and ordered logit in model 
2. Standard errors adjusted for clustering on countries in parentheses. 
* significant at .1 level  ** at .05 level  *** at .01 level. 
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Table 5. Testing for heterogeneity within democracies. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Derogations 
Non-derogable 
rights index Disapp. Killings Torture Rel. freed. 
Derogable 
rights index Imprisonment Assembly Movement Speech Electoral 
  in democracies w/o truly 0.000494 0.000259 0.000329 -9.35e-05 0.000439 -0.000632 -0.000268 0.000175 -0.000237 0.000101 -0.000365 
     competitive multi-party elections [0.000942] [0.000309] [0.000560] [0.000421] [0.000344] [0.00140] [0.000717] [0.000424] [0.000430] [0.000334] [0.000351] 
  in democracies with truly -0.00104 8.88e-05 -0.000795* -0.000330 4.32e-05 -0.00237* -0.000879 -0.000395 -0.000263 -0.000246 -0.000564 
     competitive multi-party elections [0.000653] [0.000282] [0.000473] [0.000300] [0.000300] [0.00139] [0.000796] [0.000344] [0.000374] [0.000316] [0.000527] 
truly competitive multi-party elections 0.404*** -0.00380 0.248* 0.160* 0.0633 0.862*** 0.179* 0.178** 0.141* 0.162 0.199** 
 [0.139] [0.0398] [0.134] [0.0910] [0.0865] [0.308] [0.100] [0.0715] [0.0815] [0.120] [0.0908] 
            
  in democracies w/o highest level of -0.000319 0.000302 -5.29e-05 -0.000568* 0.000297 -0.00260* -0.00122* 0.000142 -0.000724 -5.95e-05 -0.000690** 
     executive constraints [0.000845] [0.000390] [0.000666] [0.000328] [0.000393] [0.00140] [0.000722] [0.000435] [0.000510] [0.000338] [0.000318] 
  in democracies with highest level of 0.000658 8.47e-05 6.48e-05 0.000508 0.000346 0.00113 0.000964 -0.000250 0.000504* 1.31e-05 -5.03e-05 
     executive constraints [0.00130] [0.000246] [0.000475] [0.000622] [0.000310] [0.00219] [0.00100] [0.000708] [0.000278] [0.000341] [0.000462] 
highest level of executive constraints 0.141 0.0987 0.0588 -0.0166 -0.0882 0.139 0.241*** 0.194** -0.198*** -0.0774 -0.0387 
 [0.191] [0.0702] [0.110] [0.0678] [0.0911] [0.242] [0.0780] [0.0795] [0.0696] [0.0966] [0.0884] 
 
Note: Linear fixed effects estimator. Standard errors adjusted for clustering on countries in parentheses. 
* significant at .1 level  ** at .05 level  *** at .01 level. 
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Table 6. Testing for heterogeneity within autocracies. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Derogations 
Non-derogable 
rights index Disapp. Killings Torture Rel. freed. 
Derogable 
rights index Imprisonment Assembly Movement Speech Electoral 
  in autocracies w/o  -0.00421*** -0.00297*** -0.000866 -0.000480 -0.000204 -0.00186*** -2.56e-05 0.000356 -0.000158 -0.000508** -0.00152*** 
     single-party system [0.000903] [0.000402] [0.000622] [0.000307] [0.000327] [0.000642] [0.000352] [0.000451] [0.000110] [0.000228] [0.000196] 
  in autocracies with  -0.00283** -0.00245*** -0.000558 0.000211 0.000169 -0.000586 0.000542 0.00101* -0.000599 -0.000348 -0.00124*** 
     single-party system [0.00123] [0.000704] [0.000811] [0.000392] [0.000607] [0.00132] [0.000518] [0.000539] [0.000478] [0.000362] [0.000356] 
single-party system -0.181 0.0148 -0.0388 -0.201 -0.203 -0.502* -0.142 -0.175 -0.0711 -0.0668 -0.0190 
 [0.439] [0.139] [0.262] [0.144] [0.178] [0.290] [0.0960] [0.126] [0.120] [0.117] [0.0906] 
            
  in autocracies w/o -0.000759 -9.05e-05 -0.000967 0.000155 -0.000310 -0.000312 -0.000340 3.89e-05 -0.00251* 0.000248 0.00214 
     military government [0.00278] [0.000932] [0.000666] [0.00180] [0.00131] [0.00242] [0.000569] [0.000765] [0.00130] [0.00116] [0.00241] 
  in autocracies with -0.00300*** -0.00176*** -0.000967 -0.000333 -0.000219 -0.00301** 3.94e-05 -0.000388 -0.000946** -0.000709** -0.000954** 
     military government [0.00100] [0.000510] [0.000690] [0.000416] [0.000367] [0.00125] [0.000428] [0.000756] [0.000407] [0.000307] [0.000418] 
military government 0.287 -0.153 0.348** 0.0923 -0.0738 0.590* 0.0653 0.151 0.0736 0.185** 0.0831 
 [0.480] [0.203] [0.142] [0.184] [0.0650] [0.330] [0.138] [0.134] [0.178] [0.0785] [0.0801] 
 
Note: Linear fixed effects estimator. Standard errors adjusted for clustering on countries in parentheses. 
* significant at .1 level  ** at .05 level  *** at .01 level. 
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Online appendix table 1. Robustness tests: Different model specification and definitions of key variables. 
 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
Derogations Robustn. test 
Non-derogable 
rights index Disapp. Killings Torture Rel. freed. 
Derogable 
rights index Imprisonment Assembly Movement Speech Electoral 
  in autocracies Lagged  -0.00476*** -0.00280* -0.00438 -0.538*** -0.00372 -0.00570* -0.512*** -0.0147*** -0.00920*** -0.363*** -0.00129 
  in anocracies  dep variable 0.00494* 0.00678** 0.0101 -0.0906*** -0.00274 -0.00764** -0.359*** -0.0271** -0.00178 -0.352*** -0.394*** 
  in democracies  0.000852 0.000731 -0.00208 0.000871 0.000861 -0.000891 -0.000351 -0.000866 -0.00211 0.00143 -0.00135 
             
  in autocracies Derogation -2.418*** -0.843 -2.600** -14.96*** -0.510 -1.599* -16.48*** -2.202 -3.630*** -11.71*** 0.209 
  in anocracies    dummy -0.177 -0.147 1.371 -14.98*** -2.442 -2.934** -15.81*** -3.947*** -3.834** -16.12*** -17.07*** 
  in democracies  -0.0310 0.197 -0.428 -0.0857 0.182 -0.674* -0.658 -0.639 -0.400 0.417 -0.705 
             
  in autocracies Democracy def.: -0.00861*** -0.00419*** -0.00801*** -0.497*** -0.00384 -0.0103*** -0.566*** -0.0179*** -0.00918** -0.425*** -0.00483 
  in anocracies  (polity2>=6) -0.000719 0.000560 0.00393 -0.0757*** -0.00328 -0.00573** -0.0101*** -0.00521 -0.00475* -0.366*** -0.00572* 
  in democracies  0.000415 0.000277 -0.00230 0.000178 4.89e-05 -0.00321* -0.00201 -0.00210 -0.00221 0.000364 -0.00370 
             
  in autocracies Democracy def.: -0.00875*** -0.00422*** -0.00867*** -0.556*** -0.00441 -0.0101*** -0.560*** -0.0176*** -0.00901** -0.366*** -0.00488 
  in anocracies  (polity2>=7) -0.000176 0.00140 0.00371 -0.430*** -0.00170 -0.00620*** -0.00814** -0.00499 -0.00485** -0.00874 -0.00508** 
  in democracies  0.000304 -0.000548 -0.00385*** 0.000664 -0.000546 -0.00238 -0.00142 -0.00155 -0.00141 0.00121* -0.00378 
             
  in autocracies Open-ended -0.00868*** -0.00483 -0.601*** -0.592*** -0.0218* -0.00196 -0.684*** -0.00972 -0.736*** -0.439*** 0.0106* 
  in anocracies   derogations -0.00329 -7.24e-05 -0.00107 -0.0759*** -0.00818** -0.0111*** -0.391*** -0.0469 -0.00966 -0.373*** -0.422*** 
  in democracies   set to missing -0.000751 -0.000495 -0.000569 -0.000684 0.00163 -0.00267 -0.00188 -0.00197 -0.00175 0.000375 -0.00286 
             
  in autocracies Derog. periods -0.00928*** -0.00405** -0.00817*** -0.479*** -0.00354 -0.0162*** -0.566*** -0.0163*** -0.00786** -0.248*** -0.454*** 
  in anocracies   with regime type -0.000845 0.00135 0.00265 -0.0787*** -0.00834*** -0.00953** -0.409*** -0.0482 -0.00990 -0.337*** -0.436*** 
  in democracies   change set to -0.000958 -0.00103 -0.00410** -0.00103 0.000753 -0.00245 -0.00248 -0.00101 -0.00165 0.000857 -0.00202 
   missing            
 
Note: Fixed effects ordered logit estimator. Standard errors adjusted for clustering on countries. Only coefficients shown. 
* significant at .1 level  ** at .05 level  *** at .01 level. 
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Online appendix table 1. Robustness tests: Testing alternative hypotheses to political regime type. 
 
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
 
Non-derogable 
rights index Disapp. Killings Torture Rel. freed.
Derogable 
rights index Imprisonment Assembly Movement Speech Electoral 
Derogations            
   in countries w/o court able to -0.00296 -0.00113 -0.00144 -0.000401 -0.000599 -0.00156 0.00238 -0.00572** -0.00779* 0.00194 0.000237 
     rule on executive acts [0.00207] [0.00304] [0.00261] [0.00230] [0.00266] [0.00266] [0.00235] [0.00275] [0.00463] [0.00263] [0.00409] 
   in countries with court able to -0.00211 0.00225 -0.00128 -0.0482 -0.000730 -0.00566*** -0.00850*** -0.00506** -0.00374** -0.00190 -0.00599*** 
     rule on executive acts [0.00200] [0.00142] [0.00406] [0.0301] [0.00208] [0.00158] [0.00271] [0.00254] [0.00184] [0.00185] [0.00199] 
court able to rule on exec. acts 0.386 1.069* 0.597 0.714 -0.448 0.625 0.280 0.428 0.633 -0.106 -0.0862 
 [0.449] [0.556] [0.525] [0.923] [0.692] [0.508] [0.716] [0.560] [0.701] [0.735] [0.649] 
            
derogations -0.00236 -0.00261 0.000505 -0.00634 0.000826 -0.00625** -0.0139*** -0.00535 -0.000909 -0.00729* -0.00300 
 [0.00302] [0.00242] [0.00539] [0.00714] [0.00441] [0.00290] [0.00477] [0.00412] [0.00261] [0.00387] [0.00277] 
rule of law 0.212* 0.176 0.0932 -0.399 0.165 -0.106 -0.205 -0.0416 0.281 -0.177 -0.0883 
 [0.116] [0.134] [0.136] [0.364] [0.195] [0.134] [0.185] [0.152] [0.248] [0.170] [0.161] 
derogations * rule of law -0.000116 0.000277 -0.000782 0.000889 -0.000772 0.000578 0.00315*** 0.000446 -0.000999 0.00191** -0.000793 
 [0.000804] [0.000814] [0.000990] [0.00156] [0.00106] [0.000681] [0.000993] [0.000907] [0.00101] [0.000814] [0.000836] 
            
derogations -0.00389 -0.00551*** 0.00816 -0.00315 0.00406 -0.00712*** -0.00554* -0.00522 -0.00698 0.00297 -0.00717* 
 [0.00271] [0.00209] [0.00576] [0.00442] [0.00267] [0.00212] [0.00305] [0.00363] [0.00437] [0.00194] [0.00377] 
civil society strength -0.00196 0.00644** 0.00376 -0.00809* 0.00186 0.00124 -7.94e-05 0.00364 -0.0133 0.00490 -0.00247 
 [0.00353] [0.00296] [0.00358] [0.00431] [0.00365] [0.00223] [0.00291] [0.00678] [0.0108] [0.00324] [0.00156] 
derogations * civil society 8.77e-06 5.01e-05* -0.000194* 1.47e-05 -7.89e-05 3.05e-06 -4.49e-06 -6.79e-06 2.88e-05 -8.65e-05** 2.65e-05 
 [4.34e-05] [2.97e-05] [0.000116] [4.49e-05] [4.93e-05] [3.05e-05] [3.33e-05] [5.51e-05] [6.04e-05] [3.82e-05] [5.47e-05] 
 
Note: Fixed effects ordered logit estimator. Standard errors adjusted for clustering on countries in parentheses. 
* significant at .1 level  ** at .05 level  *** at .01 level. 
 
